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Abstract
A crucial challenge in network theory is the study of the robustness of
a network when facing a sequence of failures. In this work, we propose a
dynamical definition of network robustness based on Information Theory,
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that considers measurements of the structural changes caused by failures of
the network’s components. Failures are defined here, as a temporal process
defined in a sequence. Robustness is then evaluated by measuring dissimi-
larities between topologies after each time step of the sequence, providing a
dynamical information about the topological damage. We thoroughly ana-
lyze the efficiency of the method in capturing small perturbations by consid-
ering different probability distributions on networks. In particular, we find
that distributions based on distances are more consistent in capturing net-
work structural deviations, as better reflects the consequences of the failures.
Theoretical examples and real networks are used to study the performance
of this methodology.
Keywords:
PACS: 89.75.-k,89.75.Fb, 89.70.Cf
1. Introduction
There are several works dealing with the concept of robustness, however,
there is still no consensus on a definitive definition. Robustness is usually
described as the ability of the network to continue performing (Albert et al.,
2000), or, as the capacity in maintaining its functionality after failures or
attacks (Fiedler, 1973; Iyer et al., 2013; Dekker and Colbert, 2004). These
general definitions are perhaps the most used in the literature, however, they
cannot exactly grasp the complexity of the concept that network’s robustness
could have. Some other works describe robustness as the capacity of the
network in maintaining its efficiency in the presence of failures (Crucitti
et al., 2003, 2004). In some sense, this definition provides more information
about the network’s topological structure, as its efficiency depends on the
network’s shortest path lengths (Latora and Marchiori, 2007).
The study of how robust a network is when facing random failures or tar-
geted attacks is a major challenge in network theory. Several methodologies
have been proposed to measure network robustness. Approaches based on
information routing (Boginski et al., 2009; Pu et al., 2012b, 2013), structural
controllability (Liu et al., 2011; Pu et al., 2012a) or in the proposal of a more
destructive attack strategy in networks (Arulselvan et al., 2009; Pu et al.,
2015), can be found in the literature; being the most popular those based on
percolation theory (Albert et al., 2000; Cohen et al., 2000; Callaway et al.,
2000), and on the size of the biggest connected component (BC) (Holme
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et al., 2002; Allesina and Pascual, 2009; Salathe´ et al., 2010; Iyer et al.,
2013). Although these measures showed to be useful in many cases, they
are not as sensitive as they should, to the detection of failures that do not
disconnect the network or that do not modify its diameter. Depending on
the network structure, it is possible to attack great part of it, keeping these
measures blind to the changes.
In this work, we propose a measure for network robustness based on the
Jensen-Shannon divergence, an Information Theory quantifier that already
showed to be very effective in measuring small topological changes in a net-
work (Carpi et al., 2011; Schieber and Ravetti, 2013; Schieber et al., 2014).
This method considers failures occurring in a temporal sequence capturing, in
some sense, the dynamics of the role of the remaining links after each single
failure. The Jensen-Shannon divergence quantifies the topological damage
of each time step due to failures, and the robustness measure provides the
cumulative information of these sequential topological damages. It is worth
noticing that this approach does not consider the consequences of the dy-
namical process operating through the network.
2. Methodology
Quantification of network robustness could be thought as the distance
that a given topology is apart from itself after a failure. We assume that
the robustness value ranges from 0, the greatest variation, to 1, unchanged
characteristics. In other words, a higher robustness value implies in smaller
structural changes. In this work we consider a link failure, its removal, and
a node failure in the removal of all it incident links.
Let G be a network defined by a set V (G) of N nodes, a set E(G) of M
links and a set W (E(G)) containing the edges strengths. A network failure
event f is defined as the removal of a subset of edges f ⊂ E(G). A time-
ordered sequence of failures F = {ft1 , ft2 , . . . , ftn} in G can be interpreted
as a sequence of the resulting networks after each event (Gti)i∈{0, 1,...,n} such
that Gt0 = G and Gti is the network obtained after the failure fti in Gti−1 .
For simplicity, here we consider only discrete time intervals given by ti = i.
Considering the set NF of all possible sequences of failures in a network
G, a robustness function with respect to G is a function R:NF → [0, 1]. The
distance between two networks is computed as the distance between prob-
ability distributions used to characterize them. Without loss of generality,
discrete distributions will be considered henceforth.
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The Jensen-Shannon divergence between two probability distributions P
and Q is defined as the Shannon entropy of the average minus the average of
the entropies. This measure was proven to be the square of a metric between
probability distributions (Lin, 1991), bounded by 1, and defined as:
J H(P,Q) = H
(
P + Q
2
)
− H(P ) + H(Q)
2
,
being H(P ) = −∑i pi log2 pi, the entropy that measures the amount of un-
certainty in a probability distribution. Readers are referred to the Supple-
mentary Information material (SI) for a discussion on the continuous case.
It is possible then, to define the robustness of G, for any given sequence
of n failures (Gt)t∈{1, 2,...,n} and probability distribution P as:
RP (G|(Gt)t∈{1, 2,...,n}) =
n∏
t=1
[
1− J H(P (Gt), P (Gt−1))
]
, (1)
being G0 = G.
A more suitable form of equation (1) can be obtained via recurrence
relation:
RP (G|(Gt)t∈{1, 2,...,n}) =
n∏
t=1
RP (Gt−1|Gt), (2)
in which, for each time step, RP (Gt−1|Gt) indicates how affected the topology
of the network Gt−1 is after a single failure resulting in Gt. The robustness
function depends on the network’s topology, and also on the sequence of
failures. The same link possesses different importance (effect) in the topology,
depending on its position in the failure sequence. The use of the product of
the temporal fluctuations (RP (Gt−1|Gt)) allows us to have a perception of
the temporal damage due the sequence of failures.
It is important to notice that the computation of the network robustness,
when defined as in equation (1) could consider any probability distribution
able to represent features of the network. This work specifically considers
the degree distribution, commonly used to characterize network’s structures,
and the distance distribution that contains rich information about the graph
structure. The degree and distance distributions are here defined for un-
weighted and undirected networks. In Section I of the SI readers can find
a discussion other network robustness measurements and in section VI the
analysis of a directed and weighted network is performed.
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Given a node i, its degree, represented by ki, is the number of edges
incident to it. Then, the degree distribution Pdeg(k) is the fraction of nodes
with degree k. The distance from the node i to node j, di,j, is the length of
the shortest path from i to j. If there is no such path from i to j, di,j equals
∞. Then, the distance distribution Pδ(d) is the fraction of pairs of nodes at
distance d. Both degree and distance distributions are discrete and defined
on the sets {0, 1, . . . , N − 1} and {1, 2, . . . , N − 1, ∞}, respectively.
3. Discussions and Computational Experiments
With the aim of comparing the performance of the methodology based on
RPdeg and RPδ with commonly used methods based on the biggest connected
component (Rbc) and percolation (Rpid), we consider the deletion of a single
link on a complete graph with N nodes, the most robust unweighted and
undirected graph.
Rbc is obtained by computing the fraction of nodes belonging to the
biggest connected component. In this case, Rbc does not notice the removal
of any link, as no disconnection is achieved. It is possible to strategically
remove N2/2− 2N + 1 links, leaving just the minimum spanning tree, where
robustness measures based on the biggest connected component remain blind
to these attacks.
Percolation based measures correlate the robustness value of the network
with the critical percolation threshold and can be computed in several ways.
One of the most common methods depends on the number of links removed
until increasing the diameter of the network. Rpid indicates the variation
of the original diameter d0 with respect to diameter d after a sequence of
failures, computed by Rpid = d0/d.
In the case of the complete graph, the deletion of a single link increases
the network diameter in one unit, however, after the first attack Rpid may
become unable to detect subsequent events. In order to increase the network’s
diameter in one more unit, the removal of N − 2 specific links are needed.
The proposed robustness measure is able to detect the removal of any
single link of the network, independently of which probability distribution
(Pdeg, Pδ) is evaluated. Values for RPdeg and RPδ can be then, easily computed
as functions of N . The removal of a single link in a complete graph with 106
nodes, implies in changes of the order of 10−6 for RPdeg and 10
−13 for RPδ .
For a complete graph of N = 107, changes are of the order of 10−7 for RPdeg
and 10−15 for RPδ .
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Among the measures here considered, only RPdeg and RPδ showed to be
capable of capturing the removal of any single link, showing a gradual de-
crease in the robustness values, as more links are removed from the network.
This could be of relevance in situations in which it is necessary to plan the in-
clusion of new links to improve the robustness of the network. Methodologies
based on the size of the biggest connected component, or on the percolation
threshold, are not able to properly guide in this purpose. It is important to
point out, that the robustness measure here proposed, depends not only on
the network topology but on the sequence of failures over time, aiming to
quantify the vulnerability of a given structure under a series of deterministic
or stochastic failures. The process of fixing failures cannot be measured in
the same way, but the degree and distance probability distributions seem to
be adequate to this purpose.
There are interesting differences between Pdeg and Pδ. The computational
complexity to obtain the degree distribution is linear, plus a constant cost to
update it, after any link removal. The best known algorithm for obtaining
Pδ requires O(N2.376) in time complexity (Tang et al., 2009), and the compu-
tational cost of the PDF update depends on the link removed. However new
algorithms as the ANF or HyperANF (algorithms based on HyperLogLog
counters) offer an extremely fast and precise approach (Boldi and Vigna,
2013; Palmer et al., 2002; Crescenzi et al., 2011; Boldi et al., 2011), obtain-
ing very good approximations of the distance probability distribution for
graphs with millions of nodes in a few seconds. In the SI readers can find a
table with the computational complexity of the most common methods.
Another important comparison is the information that can be assessed
from both distributions, and their correlation with topological structures.
The network’s average degree, mean degree and the minimum and maxi-
mum degree are immediately obtained from the degree distribution. The
network’s efficiency, diameter, average path length, fraction of disconnected
pairs of nodes and other distance features are easily obtained from the dis-
tance distribution.
Figure 1 shows a simple network structure to analyze the correlation of
the robustness values with different topological changes. Individual removal
of links `i, `j and `r are performed. Rbc only detects the disconnection of
the biggest connected component, being not sensitive to the removal of `j
and `r. Rpid detects the removal of `j and `i, but fails in capturing the
removal of `r, as there is no modification in the diameter. The RPdeg detects
every single failure, however, its value does not properly reflect the network’s
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Edge Removed RPδ RPdeg Rbc Rpid
`i 0.447 0.862 0.500 0.000
`j 0.943 0.922 1.000 0.750
`r 0.998 0.857 1.000 1.000
Figure 1: Computation of the structural robustness for three different single edge removal:
`i, `j and `r, respectively.
disconnection (`i). The measure based on the distance distribution (RPδ)
captures, in a more appropriate way, each of the above-mentioned network
failures, especially those aspects concerning disconnections on a connected
network. This example captures important advantages and disadvantages of
each robustness measure. In the SI, other quantifiers to measure robustness
are also evaluated. However, the use of the distance distribution shows to be
the most adequate for this analysis.
Let us now analyze two sequences of failures considering `i and `j. If link
`i fails at instant t = 1 and link `j fails at instant t = 2, RPδ = 0.4377. Now,
if the sequence is inverted considering link `j failing at instant t = 1 and link
`i failing at instant t = 2, RPδ= 0.4564. This example depicts how the roles
and topological importance of the remaining links after a failure are reflected
by RPδ .
We test the proposed methodology on several real networks, nevertheless,
only the results for two of them are depicted in the main text, the Dolphin
Social Network (Lusseau et al., 2003) and the Western States Power Grid of
the United States network (Watts and Strogatz, 1998). Readers are referred
to the SI section V for applications on other networks.
The Dolphin network is an undirected social network of bottlenose dol-
phins (genus Tursiops). The nodes are the bottlenose dolphins of a commu-
nity from New Zealand, where an edge indicates a frequent association be-
tween dolphin pairs occurring more often than expected by chance (Lusseau
et al., 2003). The dolphins were observed between 1994 and 2001. It presents
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N = 62, M = 159, an average degree of 5.13, an average path length of 3.357,
and a clustering coefficient of 0.258.
The Power Grid Network is the undirected and unweighted representa-
tion of the topology of the Western States Power Grid of the United States,
compiled by Duncan Watts and Steven Strogatz (Watts and Strogatz, 1998).
It presents, N = 4941, M = 6594, an average degree of 2.67, an average path
length of 18.99, and a clustering coefficient of 0.103.
In both cases, at each time step a single link is randomly removed until the
global disconnection of approximately 10% of their links. Thirty independent
experiments were performed and, at each time step, the robustness measure
for each experiment is computed. Figure 2 depicts the composition of violin
plots of the robustness value, where RmP indicates the minimum robustness
value found at each time step.
It is possible to see from Figures (2.a) and (2.c) that the robustness
measure computed from the degree distribution shows a smoother behavior,
as it is unable to detect cluster disconnections. This is not the case for the
distance distribution, in which the fraction of disconnected pairs of nodes
is detected (see Figures (2.b) and (2.d)). The large decrease in the RPδ
values usually represents cluster disconnections from the network. As we are
analyzing average values, the disconnection may occur in a fraction of the
thirty independent experiments only.
The large variability of single robustness values for the Dolphin network
reflects the extent of the damage that certain failures can cause, showing
the Dolphin network more susceptible to random failures than the US Power
Grid. The robustness measures, in particular those computed through the
distance distributions, Figures (2.b) and (2.d) also show big leaps when the
link removal is around 6% and 9% for Dolphin and 3% and 6% for the Power
Grid, indicating network’s disconnections.
Figure 3 compares the RmP values with two sequences of failures for each
experiment; the sequences presenting the lowest robustness value at the end
of the attack (RPδ(16) for Dolphin and RPδ(660) for Power Grid) and the
sequences with the lowest robustness value at the first time step (RPδ(1)).
Note that the sequences of failures resulting in lower robustness values are not
the most efficient in destroying the network at the beginning of the process.
This behavior occurs because the robustness measure provides cumulative
information about the evolution of the state of the network (see Equation
(2)). A small RP (Gt|Gt−1) value indicates that, at time t, the failure of
certain links is critical, generating bigger changes in the topology.
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Figure 2: Robustness measures under random failures for Dolphin and Power Grid net-
works. At each time step, a random edge is disconnected from the network and RPdeg ,
RPδ functions are computed. The experiment is independently executed 30 times. Results
for the Dolphin networks are depicted in (a) RPdeg and (b) RPδ . Results for the Power
Grid network are presented in (c) RPdeg and (d) RPδ . In all cases, at each time step, the
minimum robustness values are also indicated by RmP .
This methodology could also be applied to detect critical elements, such
as the nodes and links in the US power grid network that, when individually
removed, cause a major disturbance in the network’s structure. Figure 4
shows the 10 most critical links and nodes that produce the largest robustness
values variation (see table in Figure 4). Critical elements for US power grid
network identified by RPdeg , as well as results for Dolphin network, can be
found in SI; cf. Figures S3-S5.
The knowledge of critical elements is of great importance to plan strate-
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Figure 3: Evolution of the RPδ of two different sequences of failures: the sequence that
ends with the lowest robustness value, RPδ(16) and RPδ(660), and the sequence in which
the first removal is most effective, RPδ(1). In both cases, at each time step, the minimum
robustness values are also indicated by RmPδ . (a) Dolphin network and (b) US Power Grid
network.
gies either to protect or to efficiently attack networks. In both scenarios, the
knowledge about how the network continues to perform after failures is of
paramount importance. It is interesting noticing that the problem of finding
the best sequence of links to destroy the network can be solved through com-
binatorial optimization approaches. Readers are referred to SI, section VI
for a computational experiment considering targeted attacks in two directed
and weighted real networks.
4. Final Remarks
We propose a novel methodology to measure the robustness of a network
to component failures or targeted attacks. This mathematical formulation is
based on the consideration that the network robustness is a measure related
to the distance that a given topology is apart from itself after a sequence of
failures, rather that a single characteristic of the topology. This sequence is
defined as a time dependent process in which, a subset of links is disconnected
at each time step. The method provides a dynamic robustness profile that
shows the response of the network’s topology to each event, quantifying the
vulnerability of these intermediate topologies.
Although the methodology is comprehensive enough to be used with dif-
ferent probability distributions, the use of distances shows to be more consis-
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tent in capturing network structural deviations, in the sense that their values
are correlated with the consequences of the failures in the network topology.
Different from the methods found in the literature, the method can efficiently
work with disconnections, as the distance PDF is able to acknowledge the
fraction of disconnected pairs of nodes. Furthermore, it is able to detect
all changes, including those perceived by Rbc and Rpid , resulting in a more
general approach.
Figure 4: Detection of the ten percent of the most critical links and nodes, considering RPδ
over the Western States Power Grid of the United States network. Red nodes represent
the fraction of 10 of network’s vertices such that its single disconnection causes a big
reduction on the RPδ value. Blue links represent the fraction of 10 of network’s edges such
that its single disconnection causes a big reduction on the RPδ value. The table shows the
robustness values of the top 10 critical network elements.
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